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1Introduction: Law versus the State
Why would an entrenched authoritarian regime establish an independent
constitutional court with the power of judicial review? This is one of the
most intriguing questions for students of contemporary Egyptian poli-
tics. In a country where the ruling regime exerts its influence on all facets
of political and associational life, it granted the Supreme Constitutional
Court (SCC) substantial autonomy from executive control. The paradox
is all the more intriguing when one reviews the surprisingly bold rulings
that the SCC delivered in a variety of areas over the past quarter-century.
The Court consistently worked to curtail executive powers, expand free-
dom of expression, and shield groups active in civil society from state
domination. Moreover, it provided the most important avenue for oppo-
sition parties, human rights groups, and political activists of every stripe
to credibly challenge the Egyptian government for the first time since
the 1952 military coup. Opposition parties used the SCC to contest elec-
toral laws and strict constraints on political activity, human rights groups
used the SCC to strengthen civil and human rights safeguards, leftists
initiated litigation aimed at blocking the regime’s privatization program,
and even Islamists mobilized through the SCC to challenge the secular
underpinnings of the state. In the process, the Supreme Constitutional
Court stood at the center of the most heated debates concerning the
political direction and even the fundamental identity of the Egyptian
state.
Scholars have generally regarded courts in authoritarian states as the
pawns of their regimes, upholding the interests of governing elites and
frustrating the efforts of their opponents. Yet in Egypt, a country with
one of the most durable authoritarian regimes in the world, opposition
activists have found judicial institutions to be their frequent allies. Why
1
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did Egypt’s authoritarian regime establish a constitutional court with
almost complete independence from executive control in 1979? Moreover,
why did the regime not immediately reverse its reforms once the Supreme
Constitutional Court began to challenge the executive branch in high-
profile cases? Similarly, why did Egypt’s rulers empower the administra-
tive courts, an important avenue through which Egyptian citizens initiate
(and win) lawsuits against state officials, all the way up to cabinet minis-
ters and the President of the Republic himself?
Conventional understandings of authoritarian political systems deny
the possibility of judicial politics emerging from within authoritarian
states. Take, for instance, the following statement from one of the most
frequently referenced works in the new scholarship on the judicialization
of politics:
It is hard to imagine a dictator, regardless of his or her uniform or ideo-
logical stripe, (1) inviting or allowing even nominally independent judges
to increase their participation in the making of major public policies, or
(2) tolerating decision-making processes that place adherence to legalistic
procedural rules and rights above the rapid achievement of desired substan-
tive outcomes. The presence of democratic government thus appears to be a
necessary, though certainly not a sufficient, condition for the judicialization
of politics.1
Such caricatures of authoritarian regimes tend to produce binary under-
standings of judicial politics across regime types. One is led to believe
that democracies enjoy judicial independence, but authoritarian states do
not; that courts in democratic states preserve citizens’ rights, but courts
in authoritarian states do not. To be sure, most scholars of judicial poli-
tics have few illusions about the ambiguities of law and legal institutions
in democratic settings. But when constructed as a stark dichotomy, even
one who is familiar with the significant shortcomings and institutionalized
miscarriages of justice in U.S. courts might be tempted to indulge momen-
tarily in a false sense of complacency. A sober understanding of judicial
1 Neal Tate, “Why the Expansion of Judicial Power,” in The Global Expansion of Judicial
Power, eds. C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, 28 (New York: New York University
Press, 1995). It is interesting to note that in a different forum, Tate himself observed that
the “place and function of courts in authoritarian regimes is too little discussed.” See,
Neal Tate and Stacia Haynie, “Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts: A Time
Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court, 1961–1987.” Law and Society Review
27 (1993).
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politics requires scholars to question not only the “myth of rights” in
democratic settings, but also our simplistic understandings of how judicial
institutions function in authoritarian states.2 The task is arguably all the
more important at this critical juncture in world history, when the distinc-
tion between authoritarian and democratic states are beginning to blur in
many parts of the world.
Until now, however, the same nuanced understanding that compara-
tive law scholars bring to bear on courts as contested sites in democratic
polities has largely been missing from our knowledge of legal struggles in
authoritarian polities. The assumption that democracy is a prerequisite
for the emergence of judicial power is so completely taken for granted
in the comparative law and political science literatures that research on
judicial politics in one-party states is rare. But interestingly, nearly every
empirical study of courts in authoritarian polities reveals that the real-
ity on the ground is far more complex than we typically imagine.3 In
many single-party states, vigorous and meaningful legal struggles take
place daily, and courts provide the most important sites of state-society
contention in the formal political arena. This book brings courts cen-
ter stage as an arena of political contention in one such authoritarian
state where we would not intuitively expect to observe vigorous legal
struggles.
law versus the egyptian state
The military regime that seized power in Egypt’s 1952 coup d’e´tat placed
the advancement of such substantive concerns as national independence,
redistribution of national wealth, economic development, and Arab
nationalism over the procedural niceties of liberal democracy. Within a
few months of assuming power, Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and the Free Offi-
cers annulled the Constitution and dissolved all political parties, thus initi-
ating a decided shift away from the established political order.4 Two years
later, the regime moved against the Egyptian administrative court system,
2 Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
3 Chapter 2 examines this thin but provocative body of research on courts in authoritarian
regimes.
4 Nasser did not assume formal control of the Revolutionary Command Council until
1954, but it is generally acknowledged that he was the real force behind the regime from
the time of the coup.
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the Majlis al-Dawla.5 ‘Abd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri, president of the Majlis
al-Dawla and architect of the Egyptian civil code, was physically beaten
by Nasser supporters and forced to resign. By 1955, the Majlis al-Dawla
was formally stripped of its institutional autonomy, and twenty promi-
nent judges were forcibly retired or transferred to nonjudicial positions.
Finally, a comprehensive law for the Majlis al-Dawla was issued in 1959
that restricted its power to review and cancel administrative acts. Given
this history, it is curious that some two decades later, the regime not only
rehabilitated the administrative court system but also established a new,
independent Supreme Constitutional Court empowered to review regime
legislation. An entrenched, authoritarian regime with no viable politi-
cal rivals rebuilt autonomous judicial institutions through which citizens
could contest administrative decisions and challenge the constitutionality
of regime legislation. Why?
Records from the period indicate that the regime consolidated power
and undermined judicial institutions in the 1950s only with significant
indirect costs. The nationalization of much of the private sector and the
elimination of all constraints on executive power produced a massive
exodus of capital from the country at precisely the time that Egypt’s new
leaders were attempting to mobilize national resources to build the econ-
omy. Egyptian citizens sent their wealth abroad at the staggering rate of
$2 billion per year, or roughly three and a half times the rate of all domestic
sources of investment. By the time of Nasser’s death in 1970, the econ-
omy was in extreme disrepair. The public sector was acutely inefficient
and required constant infusions of capital, the physical infrastructure of
the country was crumbling, massive capital flight deprived the economy
of billions of dollars each year, and military spending consumed a full
20 percent of the gross national product.
Faced with economic stagnation and escalating pressure from inter-
national lenders throughout the 1970s, Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat,
pinned the regime’s survival on attracting foreign direct investment, as
well as investment from Egyptian nationals holding tens of billions of
dollars in assets abroad. However, given the regime’s history of nation-
alizing the vast majority of the private sector, it was difficult to convince
investors that their assets would be safe from state seizure or adverse leg-
islation on entering the Egyptian market. After a full decade of failed
5 The Majlis al-Dawla (Council of State) serves as the administrative courts in Egypt,
modeled on the French Council d’Etat.
Introduction: Law versus the State 5
attempts to attract investment without implementing concrete institu-
tional safeguards on property rights, the regime created an institution-
ally autonomous Supreme Constitutional Court with powers of judicial
review. The new court was designed to assuage investor concerns and
guarantee institutional constraints on executive actions, but it would also
open new avenues for political activists to challenge the state.
A second unforeseen cost that the regime incurred as a result of under-
mining judicial institutions in the 1950s was an accelerated breakdown
in administrative discipline within the state itself. The administrative
courts had operated as an important institutional channel for individ-
uals to sue state bureaucrats who had abused their power. The loss of
these institutional channels combined with the rapid expansion of the
Egyptian state resulted in the regime’s inability to adequately monitor
and discipline bureaucrats throughout the state’s administrative hierar-
chy. Administrators and bureaucrats began to abuse their power and
position to prey on citizens, and public sector managers siphoned off
resources from the state. Corruption was exacerbated still further with
the initiation of Sadat’s open-door economic policy because it increased
the opportunities for graft exponentially. The inconsistent application
of legal codes by state bureaucrats also contributed to the uncertain
investment environment, stifling attempts to attract both domestic and
foreign private investment. Corruption not only affected the state’s insti-
tutional performance but abuses of power also undermined the revolu-
tionary legitimacy that the regime had enjoyed when it seized power in the
1950s.
To counteract these pathologies, the regime enhanced the indepen-
dence and capacity of the administrative court system so it once again
could serve as an avenue for individuals to expose corruption in the
state bureaucracy. The regime increased the strength and autonomy of
the administrative courts in 1972 and further still in 1984 by returning
substantial control over appointments, promotions, and other internal
functions, all of which had been weakened or stripped completely from
them by presidential decrees two decades earlier. The government also
expanded the institutional capacity of the administrative courts by estab-
lishing additional courts of first instance and mid-level appellate courts
throughout the country. These new institutional channels increased the
accountability of government bureaucrats, enabled the regime to mon-
itor and discipline administrators diverging from their state-proscribed
mandates, and facilitated the coordination of state policy.
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Sadat also used the new Supreme Constitutional Court and the
reformed administrative courts as centerpieces for a new legitimating
ideology focused on the importance of “sayadat al-qanun” (the rule of
law) and Egypt as “dawlet mo’asasat” (a state of institutions). Institu-
tional reforms and rule-of-law rhetoric were used by Sadat to distance his
regime from the substantive failures of the Nasser regime and to build a
new legitimating narrative that was distinct from the populist foundations
of the state.
Although judicial reforms helped the government provide a credible
commitment to property rights, attract private investment, strengthen
discipline within the bureaucracy, and build a new legitimizing ideology,
the new Supreme Constitutional Court and the reformed administrative
courts did not advance the regime’s interests in a straightforward and
unambiguous fashion. Instead, judicial reforms provided institutional
openings for political activists to challenge the executive in ways that
fundamentally transformed patterns of interaction between the state and
society. For the first time since the 1952 military coup, political activists
could credibly challenge government legislation by simply initiating con-
stitutional litigation, a process that required few financial resources and
enabled activists to circumvent the regime’s highly restrictive, corporatist
political framework. Litigation became the primary strategy for political
activists to challenge the government, and they did so with surprising suc-
cess in ways that were never possible in the People’s Assembly. Figure 1.1
illustrates the growing capacity and the increasing willingness of the SCC
to strike down regime legislation.
Judicial power expanded over a two-decade period largely because
of synergistic interactions among the Supreme Constitutional Court, the
administrative courts, and three groups active in civil society – legal
professional associations, opposition parties, and human rights organi-
zations. The SCC facilitated the reemergence of this “judicial support
network,” provided its supporters with ongoing legal protection, and
afforded institutional openings for political activists to challenge the
regime. In return, the Supreme Constitutional Court depended on the
judicial support network to monitor and document human and civil rights
violations, initiate constitutional litigation, and come to its defense when
it was under attack by the regime. A tacit partnership was built on the
common interest of both defending and expanding the mandate of the
SCC (see Figure 1.2).
Beginning in the 1990s, these domestic legal struggles were internation-
alized in several significant ways. First, the capacity of the human rights
Introduction: Law versus the State 7
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figure 1.1: Rulings of Unconstitutionality by the Egyptian Supreme Constitu-
tional Court, 1980–2004. Source: SCC rulings are compiled by the Arab Republic
of Egypt in al-Mahkama al-Dusturiyya al-‘Ulia, Vol. 1–10. See also Arab Republic
of Egypt, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya.
movement was vastly expanded as a result of increased funding streams
from international human rights organizations. Moreover, links to inter-
national human rights networks enabled activists to leverage international
pressure on the Egyptian regime in coordination with domestic litiga-
tion strategies. Legal struggles were also internationalized in the 1990s
on the initiative of the Supreme Constitutional Court itself. The SCC
expanded its mandate by using international legal principles and the inter-
national treaty commitments of the Egyptian government to provide pro-
gressive interpretations of the Constitution. Ironically, the Egyptian gov-
ernment signed and ratified international conventions as window dressing
with no expectation that they would someday be used by an institution
• Provide Avenue                  
of Contestation • Document Abuses
• Initiate Litigation
• Protection from • Defend Court
State Domination   Autonomy
Judicial Support Network 
Human Rights Associations 
Opposition Parties 
Legal Professional Associations  
Supreme Constitutional 
Court
figure 1.2: Supreme Constitutional Court – Judicial Support Network Synergy.
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like the SCC to help interpret, adjudicate, and strike down repressive
legislation.
The SCC pursued a progressive political agenda for over two decades
by selectively accommodating the regime’s core political and economic
interests. In the political sphere, the SCC ruled that Egypt’s Emergency
State Security Courts were constitutional, and it conspicuously delayed
issuing a ruling on the constitutionality of civilian transfers to military
courts. Given that Egypt has remained in a perpetual state of emergency,
the Emergency State Security Courts and, more recently, the military
courts have effectively formed a parallel legal system with fewer procedu-
ral safeguards, serving as the ultimate regime check on challenges to its
power. Although the Supreme Constitutional Court had ample opportu-
nities to strike down the provisions denying citizens the right of appeal to
regular judicial institutions, it almost certainly exercised restraint because
impeding the function of the exceptional courts would likely have resulted
in a futile confrontation with the regime. Ironically, the regime’s ability
to transfer select cases to exceptional courts facilitated the emergence
of judicial power in the regular judiciary and in the SCC. The Supreme
Constitutional Court was able to push a liberal agenda and maintain its
institutional autonomy from the executive largely because the regime was
confident that it retained ultimate control of the political playing field.
Supreme Constitutional Court activism may therefore be characterized
as a case of bounded activism. SCC rulings had a clear impact on the
contours of state-society contention and the construction of political dis-
course, but the SCC was ultimately contained within a profoundly illiberal
political system.
The SCC supported the regime’s core economic interests in a simi-
lar fashion by overturning socialist-oriented legislation from the Nasser
era. The economic liberalization program, initiated in 1991, was bitterly
resisted by disadvantaged socioeconomic groups and those ideologically
committed to Nasser-era institutions of economic redistribution. But
dozens of rulings in the areas of privatization, housing reform, and labor
law reform enabled the regime to overturn socialist-oriented policies with-
out having to face direct opposition from social groups that were threat-
ened by economic reform. Liberal rulings enabled the executive leadership
to explain that they were simply respecting an autonomous rule-of-law
system rather than implementing controversial reforms through more
overt political channels.
By the late 1990s, however, the Egyptian government was increasingly
apprehensive about Supreme Constitutional Court activism. Opposition
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parties, human rights groups, and political activists had found a state
institution with the capacity and the will to curb executive powers incre-
mentally. A clear synergy had developed between the SCC and an emer-
gent judicial support network. As the regime grew increasingly nervous
about opposition advances through the SCC and the Court’s growing base
of political support, the regime moved to undermine their efforts. Over
a five-year period, the regime employed a variety of legal and extrale-
gal measures to weaken the judicial support network and ultimately to
undermine the independence that the Supreme Constitutional Court had
enjoyed for two decades. Political retrenchment was challenged inside and
outside the courts, but political activists were unable to prevent regime
retrenchment given the overwhelming power asymmetries between the
state and social forces.
law versus the state: judicial politics
in authoritarian regimes
The Egyptian case challenges us to rethink our basic understanding of judi-
cial politics in authoritarian regimes. Why do some authoritarian rulers
empower judicial institutions? To what extent do judicial institutions open
meaningful avenues of political contestation? How do courts in author-
itarian systems structure political conflict and state-society interaction?
What strategies do judges adopt to expand their mandate and increase
their autonomy vis-a`-vis authoritarian rulers? Are there discernible pat-
terns of conflict and accommodation between judicial actors and state
leaders over time? What are the implications of these judicial struggles
for regime transition or sustained authoritarianism, and for commercial
growth or economic decline? These are questions that comparative law
scholars and political scientists seldom ask.
The first major objective of this study is to understand the dynamic
complexity of judicial politics in authoritarian states. Cross-national com-
parisons presented in the next chapter suggest that many of the dysfunc-
tions that plague the Egyptian state are common to other authoritarian
states: (1) With unchecked power, authoritarian regimes have difficulty
providing credible commitments to the protection of property rights, and
they therefore have difficulty attracting private investment; (2) Authoritar-
ian leaders face distinct disadvantages in maintaining order and discipline
in their administrative hierarchies because of low levels of transparency;
(3) With power fused into a single, dominant regime, unpopular poli-
cies are somewhat more costly to adopt because responsibility cannot
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be shifted to other institutions or parties, as is often done in pluralistic
systems; (4) Unlike democratic systems, state legitimacy is linked almost
exclusively to the success or failure of substantive policy objectives rather
than to procedural legitimacy, which makes policy failure all the more
damaging to state legitimacy.
Judicial institutions are sometimes deployed to provide remedies for
these pathologies, whether through providing credible commitments to
investors, imposing a coherent system of discipline within state bureau-
cracies, providing alternate institutions to implement unpopular policies,
or bolstering regime legitimacy. However, the cases examined here also
indicate that when courts are deployed to achieve these ends, they never
advance the interests of authoritarian rulers in a straightforward manner.
Rather, courts inevitably serve as dual-use institutions, simultaneously
consolidating the functions of the authoritarian state while paradoxically
opening new avenues for activists to challenge regime policy. These courts
often become important focal points of state-society contention.
It is important to stress two points of clarification at the outset. First,
obviously not all authoritarian regimes choose to empower judicial insti-
tutions. The claim here is that regimes sometimes deploy judicial institu-
tions to ameliorate the pathologies of authoritarian rule that are examined
in the coming chapters. To the extent that courts are utilized, a judicial-
ization of authoritarian politics will result.6 It is also critical to state at
the outset that I do not wish to suggest that judicial institutions can, by
themselves, act as guarantors of basic rights or affect basic transitions in
regime type.7 Such expectations should be qualified even in established
6 A judicialization of politics has been defined elsewhere as “(1) the process by which
courts and judges come to make or increasingly to dominate the making of public
policies that had previously been made (or, it is widely believed, ought to be made) by
other governmental agencies, especially legislatures and executives and (2) the process
by which nonjudicial negotiating and decision making forums come to be dominated
by quasi-judicial (legalistic) rules and procedures.” This book concentrates on the first
mode of judicialization of politics in authoritarian regimes. Tate, “Why the Expansion
of Judicial Power.”
7 In some cases, judicial institutions contributed to regime transitions when political
dynamics reached a tipping point (Mexico’s Constitutional Court in the 2000 fall of
the PRI, Indonesia’s Administrative Courts in the 1998 fall of Soeharto, Taiwan, and
Korea), but those cases are not representative. See Gretchen Helmke, “The Logic of
Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and
Democracy.” American Political Science Review 96 (2002): 291–303; Gretchen Helmke,
Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jodi Finkel, Judicial Reform in Latin America; David
Bourchier, “Magic Memos, Collusion and Judges with Attitude: Notes on the Politics
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liberal democracies. In addition, as it should become abundantly clear
in the chapters that follow, when regimes empower courts, they often
adopt a variety of strategies to contain the impact of judicial activism.
A better understanding of the pressures motivating judicial reform, and
the dynamics of legal mobilization that result, can help us build a more
nuanced model of judicial politics in authoritarian states.
the rule of law, development, and democracy
The Egyptian experience with rule-of-law institutions additionally chal-
lenges us to rethink the relationship between law, development, and
democracy. For nearly three decades, scholars and policymakers have
placed considerable stock in judicial reform as a panacea for the political
and economic turmoil plaguing developing countries in Latin America,
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Rule-of-law institutions are charged
with safeguarding human rights, spurring economic development, and
even facilitating transitions to democracy. Moreover, there exists a deeply
held assumption among policymakers and within much academic litera-
ture that rule-of-law institutions, vibrant market economies, and liberal
democracy reinforce one another in a virtuous cycle. Take, for instance,
the work of economists on the relationship between rule-of-law institu-
tions and economic growth. Each year, economists churn out hundreds
of empirical studies linking credible rule-of-law institutions with elevated
levels of foreign investment, external finance, and higher aggregate levels
of economic growth.8 They find that insecure property rights vis-a`-vis the
of Law in Contemporary Indonesia,” in Law, Capitalism, and Power in Asia: The Rule
of Law and Legal Institutions, ed. Kanishka Jayasuriya (New York: Routledge, 1999).
8 For just a few examples, see Stephan Knack and Philip Keefer, “Why Don’t Poor Coun-
tries Catch Up? A Cross National Test of an Institutional Explanation.” Economic
Inquiry 35 (1997): 590–602; Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, “Economic Growth and Judi-
cial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators.” European
Journal of Political Economy 19 (2003): 497–527; Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock,
What Role do Legal Institutions Play in Development? (Washington, DC: International
Finance Corporation, 1999); Abdiweli Ali, “Institutional Differences as Sources of
Growth Differences.” Atlantic Economic Journal 31 (2003): 348–362; Maria-Angels
Oliva and Luis A. Rivera-Batiz, “Political Institutions, Capital Flows, and Developing
Country Growth: An Empirical Investigation.” Review of Development Economics 6
(2002): 248–62; Robert Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1997); Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson,
“Institutions and Economic Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement,”
in Institutions and Economic Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1997); Rafael La Porta, et al., “Legal Determinants of External Finance.” Journal of
Finance 52 (1997): 1131–1150.
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state discourage private investment and that firms operating in environ-
ments of policy uncertainty “tend to have short time horizons and little
fixed capital, and will tend to be small scale” in an effort to minimize risk.9
Many legal scholars concur, explaining that “an investor will balk at a
foreign investment decision if the host country does not offer adequate
legal security and stability for investment. . . . The most pervasive legal
risk for an investor is the risk of adverse legislative change.”10 Similarly,
in their cross-national study of twenty-eight countries, Borner, Brunetti,
and Weder confirm that
Very similar problems exist in a large number of LDC’s: uncertain property
rights, unstable rules, unpredictable regulations – in short the absence of
a meaningful rule of law – regularly prevent the hoped-for private-sector
reaction to the reforms implemented under IMF and World Bank pro-
grams. . . . What many LDC’s lack is political credibility, as private business
does not believe in the stability of the rules set and enforced by the state.
[E]stablishing political credibility is a necessary precondition for economic
growth.11
The new institutional economics (NIE) thus became the dominant
framework for understanding differential rates of economic develop-
ment across countries. The policy prescriptions that followed from these
analyses were swiftly carried beyond academic studies to the policy
world.12 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made
judicial reform a cornerstone policy in the 1990s,13 explaining that “the
9 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 67.
10 David Flint, Robert Pritchard, and Thomas Chiu, “Constitutional and Legislative Safe-
guards for FDI: A Comparative Review Utilizing Australia and China,” in Economic
Development, Foreign Investment, and the Law: Issues of Private Sector Involvement,
Foreign Investment and the Rule of Law in a New Era, ed. Robert Pritchard, 104 (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996).
11 The authors conclude that “political credibility should be a prime focus of policy reform
in LDCs” and judicial checks on executive power are identified as one of the primary
mechanisms for ensuring this political credibility. Silvio Borner, Aymo Brunetti, and
Beatrice Weder, Political Credibility and Economic Development (London: St. Martin’s
Press, 1995), ix, 149, 98.
12 Economists working in the new institutionalist framework contended that “institu-
tional analysis is of paramount importance for guiding the transition to markets in
formerly centrally managed economies.” Lee Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass
North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 1.
13 The World Bank dedicated $3.8 billion to 330 rule-of-law projects in over 100 countries
between 1993 and 2003, and many more projects are currently underway. The World
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rule of law is needed to give credibility to commitments on the part of
governments” and “serious investors look for a legal system where prop-
erty rights, contractual arrangements, and other lawful activities are safe-
guarded and respected, free from arbitrary governmental action.”14
Legal and judicial reform programs were also expected to produce pos-
itive political spillovers. Ibrahim Shihata, General Counsel of the World
Bank, explained that “progress in these areas, especially the opening of the
economy and the establishment of the rule of law and of an independent
judiciary, leads to the evolution of more democratic forms of govern-
ment.”15 World Bank and other international donors working on legal
aid projects believe that judicial reform, political reform, and economic
growth positively reinforce one another.16
The Egyptian experience with judicial reform illustrates the insights
and exposes the policy limitations of the new institutional economics. On
the one hand, the NIE helps make sense of the massive exodus of capital
from Egypt during the Nasser period and the reluctance of investors to
reenter the Egyptian market without credible institutional safeguards on
property rights. The relationship between unrestrained state power and
economic stagnation is an important finding. The new institutionalist con-
cerns with judicial constraints on state power and credible third-party
contract enforcement mechanisms also make good sense, but the ques-
tion these analyses beg is whether these policy prescriptions are politically
Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform: Observations, Experiences, and Approach of the Legal
Vice-Presidency (2002); World Bank, 2003 Annual Report. Cited in Alvaro Santos, “The
World Bank’s Uses of the ‘Rule of Law’ Promise in Economic Development.” In David
Trubek and Alvaro Santos, The New Law and Economic Development (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
14 Ibrahim Shihata, “Legal Framework for Development and the Role of the World Bank
in Legal Technical Assistance” and “Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the
Role of the World Bank,” in The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays,
eds. Franziska Tschofen and Antonio Parra, 128 and 149 (London: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1995).
15 “The World Bank in the Nineties,” in The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected
Essays, eds. Franziska Tschofen and Antonio Parra (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, 1995).
16 World Bank publications illustrate the assumption that judicial reform, political reform,
and economic growth positively reinforce one another. For example, see Ana Palacio, The
Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank (Washington D.C.: The World Bank,
2006); World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions. (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 2003); Rudolf Puymbroeck, ed., Comprehensive Legal and Judicial
Development: Towards an Agenda for a Just and Equitable Society in the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001); Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Reforming Business-
Related Laws to Promote Private Sector Development: The World Bank Experience in
Africa (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000).
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feasible and sustainable. The Egyptian government was itself cognizant
of the economic and administrative issues at stake, and it implemented
judicial reforms in a deliberate fashion. However, the regime also worked
to undermine those institutional reforms (again, quite deliberately) only
two decades later when courts served as avenues through which opposi-
tion activists could mobilize against the state. An urgent question there-
fore emerges from the Egyptian experience: How effectively can courts
secure property rights and facilitate economic growth, given the possi-
bility of regime backlash, when those same institutions are inevitably
used as avenues to challenge the legal underpinnings of authoritarian
states? The Egyptian case suggests that the establishment of indepen-
dent judicial institutions designed to provide credible commitments to
the security of property rights is not as simple as much of the literature
suggests.
Whereas most public law literature discounts judicial institutions in
authoritarian regimes because they are assumed to be thoroughly political
(and therefore thought to be ineffective in the protection of citizen rights
and inconsequential in political struggles), the work by many economists
is characterized by assumptions that are surprisingly apolitical. The lit-
erature tends to presume that once implemented, judicial reforms will
remain secure because they represent a new equilibrium of lowered trans-
action costs and more efficient economic exchange.17 Politics drops out
of these analyses at precisely the moment when political dynamics begin.
Inattention to the ongoing dynamics of political contention leads many
economists to greatly underestimate the challenge of institutional reform
in developing countries.
Prominent scholars have recognized this blind spot in the literature.
The Nobel Prize–winning economist Douglass North explains that
an essential part of development policy is the creation of polities that will
create and enforce efficient property rights. However, we know very little
about how to create such polities, because the new political economy has
largely focused on the United States and developed polities. A pressing
research need is to model Third World and Eastern European polities.18
17 In the case of credible commitments, the state benefits from increased investment, a
larger tax base, and long-term political viability. Investors, on the other hand, benefit
from more secure property rights and more investment opportunities.
18 Douglass North, “Epilogue: Economic Performance through Time,” in Alston, Eggerts-
son, and North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, 353. North’s most recent
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The second major objective of this study is to address this gap in the
literature and to provide a new perspective on the political obstacles to
sustained institutional reform in authoritarian polities such as Egypt. The
Egyptian case demonstrates how nonstate actors mobilize through state
institutions, often subverting them for purposes that were not initially
intended by state leaders. As a result, state leaders often find themselves
locked in conflict with the same institutions that they had created, and they
are sometimes driven to abort their own institutional reforms. In these
circumstances, institutional development and economic growth become
collateral damage in the struggle to maintain political dominance.
What emerges from this study is a complex picture of judicial insti-
tutions that challenges core assumptions in both political science and
economics. Contrary to the presumption of most political science litera-
ture, courts in authoritarian polities are not mere pawns of their rulers.
Rather, they are often active sites of state-society contention. This politi-
cal context is also missing from the economics literature, which typically
assumes that courts protect property rights in an apolitical, mechanical
fashion. Contrary to this presumption, courts are all too vulnerable to
regime backlash if they challenge regime power.
These findings cut to the heart of perennial puzzles in the social
sciences, including the persistent barriers to institutional development,
economic growth, and democracy in the developing world. Far from
inevitably reinforcing one another in a virtuous cycle, rule-of-law institu-
tions, markets, and the state more typically interact in discordant and
unpredictable ways. The Egyptian case illustrates why regimes some-
times short-circuit their own institutional creations, despite the devastat-
ing implications for national development. Regime behavior is the result
of rational and shrewd political calculation, but the long-term effect on
institutional development and economic growth can only be described as
pathological.
work sets out to accomplish this task by integrating cognition into the process of insti-
tutional development. North explores how individuals and societies come to under-
stand the world and how those understandings enable or undermine the ability of
societies to solve dilemmas and forge institutions that promote vibrant economic
growth. North’s foray into cognition and social psychology has its merits, but it takes
us another step away from understanding how power asymmetries and the evolving
dynamics of political contention hinder institutional development. Douglass North,
Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005).
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organization of the book
Chapter 2, “The Politics of Domination: Law and Resistance in Authori-
tarian States,” examines when and why authoritarian regimes institution-
alize state functions through judicial institutions. Cross-national compar-
isons illustrate how courts are used to ameliorate a series of pathologies
that commonly afflict authoritarian states. Regimes pursuing such a judi-
cial strategy empower dual-use institutions that simultaneously consoli-
date the functions of the authoritarian state while paradoxically opening
new avenues for activists to challenge state policy. The second part of the
chapter examines the various strategies that authoritarian rulers employ
to contain judicial activism and constrain the emergence of synergistic
support networks between courts and activists in civil society.
Chapter 3, “The Establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court,”
moves to the empirical data with a focus on the relationship between
weakened rule-of-law institutions and the low volume of private invest-
ment in Egypt from 1952 to 1979. The chapter contextualizes Egypt’s
transition from a free-market economy to a socialist-oriented economy
in the 1960s and examines how unrestrained state power under Nasser’s
regime (1952–1970) forced a mass exodus of private capital. The chapter
then maps the shift back to a mixed economy under Anwar Sadat (1970–
1981), focusing on the regime’s inability to attract investment capital for
almost a full decade without backing its assurances against expropria-
tion with concrete judicial institutions that could protect property rights
effectively. The chapter makes use of extensive personal interviews and
archival data, bringing to light how state leaders understood the need for
institutional reform in the late 1970s and their motives for establishing
an independent constitutional court and resuscitating the administrative
courts.
Chapter 4, “The Emergence of Constitutional Power (1979–1990),”
examines the dual role of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the
economic and political spheres through its first decade of operation. The
SCC provided restitution for Nasser-era property rights violations, and it
shaped a new legal framework demarcating limits on state powers in the
economy. SCC rulings went much further than the regime had originally
intended when it struck down Sadat-era laws insulating the state from
the burden of providing full compensation to citizens’ claims. Next, the
chapter shifts to the impact of SCC rulings in the political sphere where
the Court chipped away at the regime’s corporatist system of political
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control by restoring political rights to opposition activists and striking
down the regime’s constraining electoral laws.
Chapter 5, “The Rapid Expansion of Constitutional Power (1991–
1997),” investigates the SCC’s role in the economic sphere through the
1990s by focusing on rulings in the areas of taxation, privatization, and
landlord-tenant relations in urban and rural markets. Here, the Supreme
Constitutional Court played a crucial role in overturning Nasser-era eco-
nomic policies while enabling the government to claim that it was simply
respecting an autonomous rule-of-law system. The second part of the
chapter examines how the SCC used this leverage to initiate an aggres-
sive political reform agenda with bold rulings in the areas of freedom
of the press, freedom of association, and electoral reform. Throughout
this period, a tacit partnership emerged between the SCC and a support
network of opposition activists, human rights organizations, and pro-
fessional syndicates. Domestic legal struggles were also internationalized
when activists and the SCC used Egypt’s international treaty obligations
to challenge and strike down repressive domestic laws. The chapter closes
with an analysis of the limits of SCC activism through an examination of
the hard cases in which the Court dared not venture, including challenges
to the draconian emergency laws and the jurisdiction of military and state
security courts. Despite impressive opposition advances made through
the SCC, court activism was ultimately a case of “bounded activism,”
which did little to undermine the regime’s core mechanisms of political
control.
Chapter 6, “Executive Retrenchment and an Uncertain Future (1998–
2005),” maps interactions among the regime, the SCC, and Court support-
ers during the period of 1998–2005. Faced with an increasingly sophisti-
cated reform movement that had the ability to use litigation as an avenue
to challenge regime legislation, the regime sought to rein in the Supreme
Constitutional Court and its judicial support network. The chapter exam-
ines how judicial support networks mobilized to defend the Court and
how two of the boldest SCC rulings sought to protect human rights orga-
nizations and opposition parties, the two most crucial elements of its
support network that were also under siege. The chapter concludes with
an evaluation of how legal mobilization alone was insufficient to save
SCC independence.
Scholars and policymakers place a great deal of faith in judicial reform
as a straightforward solution for the political and economic turmoil plagu-
ing developing countries around the world. In the concluding chapter,
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“Law, Development, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal,” the Egyptian
case is used to critique this hopeful yet somewhat simplistic understand-
ing of political and economic development. I elaborate on the insights
that the Egyptian case provides for scholarship on judicial politics, the
political economy of development, the bases of authoritarian rule, and
the barriers to democratization in the Arab world and beyond.
